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Abstract 
 Recent research concerning women and politics focuses on identifying what 
factors cause and stimulate women participation in politics.  This thesis uses the 
indicators for Millennium Development Goals 3 and 5 as a measurement basis for an 
empirical study to determine if certain factors effect women participation in Latin 
American politics. Data for these goals, to Promote Gender Equality and Empower 
Women and Improve Maternal Health, were collected for various Latin American 
countries across a 2000-2015 time series.  
Along with this data collection, this thesis focuses on testing two specific factors 
to determine their effectiveness on women representation in Latin America. These two 
factors are “women participation in parliament” and “women participation in social 
movement.”  For the first factor, this thesis records each country’s number of women in 
parliament, the existence of any gender quotas in that country, and the existence of 
female heads of states in any of those countries from 2000-2015.  The second factor is 
constructed from various sources that indicate social movement presence in each country 
from 2000-2015.   
This thesis argues that the presence of these two factors increases success for the 
indicators of MDGs 3 and 5.  This thesis begins with a review of literature surveying 
existing trends of women studies and politics along with providing arguments and 
support for the two factors tested in this thesis.  After this literature review is an analysis 
of the descriptive statistics of MDGs 3 and 5 followed by a variable analysis of the 
aforementioned factors.  Finally, this thesis concludes that “women in parliament” is an 
important factor resulting in positive outcomes for the indicators of MDGs 3 and 5.     
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Chapter I: Introduction  
The UN Millennium Summit took place in September 2000 in New York City.  
At this summit, 149 world leaders and high-ranking officials came together to form a 
document stating the global “values, principles, and objectives for the international 
agenda for the twenty-first century”(un.org). This international, collective effort created 
the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  These eight time-bound goals 
established quantifiable targets with the overarching goal to eradicate poverty.  These 
eight goals are to: (1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, (2) achieve universal 
primary education, (3) promote gender equality and empower women, (4) reduce child 
mortality, (5) improve maternal health, (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other 
diseases, (7) ensure environmental sustainability, and (8) develop a global partnership for 
development (un.org). Each goal contains specific indicators to measure success and 
progress. These indicators define the completion of each goal through the observed 
changes in country statistics over the span of 15 years (2000-2015).   
The quantifiable indicators of each MDG provide a basis for measurement and 
observation. This provides an opportunity to isolate various goals and track progress in 
the interest of learning and understanding what, if any, key factors drive their success.  
One such opportunity is the isolation of MDGs 3 and 5, to Promote Gender Equality and 
Empower Women and Improve Maternal Health, which are the focus of this thesis.  As 
time has progressed since their implementation, an analysis of these countries’ relative 
success and achievement of these goals is warranted.  An analysis of the progress for 
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MDGs 3 and 5 for various Latin American countries may subsequently provide results 
that speak to a greater discourse concerning women representation and its influence on 
women empowerment. 
 In the field of women studies, various debates concerning women’s interests and 
empowerment have focused on ways to gauge what drives women’s success and 
representation (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, Representation 10). These 
studies and their relevant assertions, further discussed in the literature review section, 
provide insight into the complexities of studying and assessing women’s interests, 
representation, and empowerment. To begin establishing a framework that may test and 
explain effective factors that drive empowerment of women, it is critical to define what 
are women’s interests.  By establishing commonalities for women’s interests, the 
indicators for the MDGs 3 and 5 solve this latter problem by providing quantifiable units 
of measurement to gauge what the UN has defined as international women’s interests.  
Isolating these two goals as the focus of this study provides a basis for empirical study 
concerning women representation and empowerment. In addition, a general trend towards 
completion of these goals may speak to a larger discourse concerning the influence of 
international organizations on domestic policies. 
 
Research Question 
As 2015 comes to a close, the target year for the accomplishment of the 
Millennium Development Goals, questions as to the success and effectiveness of these 
goals stand to be tested and proven.  Central to this thesis is the question, why have some 
countries been more successful in completing the explicit targets for MDGs 3 and 5? Is it 
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because in some countries women have more seats in legislature?  Is it because women’s 
activism in public settings, such as protests, is higher in some countries than others? Or is 
it a combination of these factors?   
Latin America provides an interesting institutional context to further explore this 
question.  Historically, Latin America has been known for its machista culture and has 
lagged behind other nations in gender equality policies (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-
Robinson, Representation 41).  This machista culture, which centers society on the 
patriarchal family unit, creates a public sphere of social and political life where men 
dominate (Jelin, Zammit, and Thomson 8). However, in the recent decade, various Latin 
American countries have gained notable recognition with the election of women to key 
government positions and even to heads of state.  These women: Dilma Rousseff (2011-
present) president of Brazil, Laura Chinchilla (2010-2014) previous president of Costa 
Rica, Michelle Bachelet (2011-present) president of Chile, and Cristina Kirchner (2007-
present) president of Argentina, are drawing attention to Latin America’s political 
environment. Latin America is the global leader for female heads of state (Kubi, The 
Politic). In this region of contrasts, women’s achievement of increased political presence 
is undeniable, as reflected by the election of these women to heads of state.  This recent 
progress in Latin America makes it an interesting case study for the effect of women 
representation on women empowerment.  
In an attempt to understand more about women representation, I focus on two 
specific variables: women representation in legislature and women in social movement 
settings.  Legislature serves as an important venue of study because it is the 
institutionalized process of achieving policy change. In addition, it serves as a 
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quantifiable quality that may be measured by the descriptive representation of women1.  
The second venue I wish to focus on is women’s social movements.  
 Women’s social movements have proven to be a characteristic for women and 
change in various Latin American states, especially following the Cold War (Jelin, 
Zammit, and Thomson 9). During this period of political oppression in various Latin 
American countries, standard and legal venues of political expression lost credibility.  
The military regimes forced political expression to external, unconventional channels 
where women were able to create their own political space (Waylen 573). In this space, 
women and men activists challenged and questioned authoritarian rule.  Through this 
space, women began to redefine the relation between the private and public sphere, 
increasing their involvement in the latter (Jelin, Zammit, and Thomson 10). 
 
Methodology and Data Set:  
To gauge the effectiveness of women representation in legislature and women 
representation in social movements, I compiled the available data for the indicators of 
MDGs 3 and 5.  For MDG 3: Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women, the 
indicators are: (1) the ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education 
(UNESCO),  (2) the share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector 
(ILO), and (3) the proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (IPU).  For 
MDG 5: Improve Maternal Health, the indicators are: (1) the maternal mortality ratio 
(UNICEF-WHO), (2) proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel (UNICEF-
																																																								
1 Descriptive representation, discussed further in the lit review section, means an assembly whose membership mirrors 
the makeup of the nation (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, Representation 3). 
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WHO), (3) the contraceptive prevalence rate, (4) the adolescent birth rate, (5) antenatal 
care coverage, and (6) the unmet need for family planning (unmilleniumproject.org). 
I gathered the data for these indicators for the following Latin American 
countries: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Although the 
MDGs were implemented in 2000, a compilation of available data from a decade prior 
broadens the time series.  This data set is used to track relative progress in achievement 
of the specified indicators for MDGs 3 and 5 for the aforementioned Latin American 
countries across the time series 1990-2015.  This data set is then analyzed and 
manipulated to determine if there is any positive or negative relationship between the 
number of women in legislature or/and the level of women movement presence and a 
country’s outcome for MDGs 3 and 5.  
To test the venue of legislature I account for the percentage of women 
representation in lower house of government for the Latin American countries (ipu.org). 
Since a comprehensive women’s movement indicator does not yet exist for Latin 
America, I construct my own social movement variable to be applied across the time 
series.  I pull from a variety of sources to monitor women’s protest activity in a given 
country at a given time.  The specifics of these components for this women’s movement 
variable is discussed later on in more detail.  
 
Thesis Structure 
	 	 		
6		
In Chapter II of my thesis, I present an overview of relevant, competing 
arguments concerning women representation in social movements and women in 
legislature.  Women representation is the expression of shared women’s interests in a 
venue. From this stems a debate concerning ‘defining’ and ‘expressing’ women’s 
interests.  Chapter III contains the research design along with the descriptive statistics for 
each indicator.  In this chapter, the countries with the most success in achieving MDGs 3 
and 5 are identified.  Achievement of these MDGs 3 and 5 are stipulated by the UN and 
are discussed in this section.  In Chapter IV I present and analyze another data set 
wherein the variables for women in legislature and women’s movements are tested to 
determine their effect on the indicators for MDG 3 and 5.  This model determines if there 
is any correlation, positive or negative, between this and the achievement of MDGs 3 and 
5. This information is examined to indicate reasons for relative correlation (or lack 
thereof).  
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Chapter II: Literature Review 
To obtain a better understanding of the relationship between women in legislature 
and women’s movements with MDGs 3 and 5, this chapter explores the existing literature 
and research about the factors that affect and promote women’s representation.  
Measuring this presents an empirical complexity. Karen Beckwith outlines four important 
questions to help analyze the dimensions of understanding women’s representation.  
These questions focus on finding, which women’s interests are being articulated, where 
they are being articulated (what venue), who is articulating them, and how they are doing 
so (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, Representation 32). 
The representation of a particular group, such as women, implies that they have 
some degree of common interests.  It follows then, that if this group is brought together 
because of common interests, they stand to benefit from the promotion and expression of 
these interests.  Thus, in order to understand and measure women’s representation, we 
must first determine what these interests are.   
A major contention in the field of women’s representation has centered on 
determining and defining women’s interests.  On one hand, scholars such as Simone de 
Beauvoir argue that there is no unified women’s identity and that women “do not 
authentically assume a subjective attitude” (Beauvoir 1953:11).  If this is the case, if there 
is not a common identity for women, then there are not any readily identifiable common 
interests.  However, Drude Dahlerup argues that if there is no “we” as a common political 
subject, women’s movements of the past constructed a political cause to unify women 
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and promote change (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, Representation 59).  In 
addition, Beckwith argues that women do have common shared experiences that shape 
their political interests.  Beckwith says that women’s experiences may be viewed as a 
shared interaction “deriving from socially constructed gendered constraints and 
exclusions,” (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, Representation 20). In this respect, 
women, as a group, have this experience as a foundation to develop their interests.  In this 
case, Beckwith defines interests as the “fundamental ‘substantive values that politics puts 
into effect and distributes’” (Jónasdóttir 1998: 40 in Hill and Chappell 2006:1).  Siding 
with the latter argument, that women’s experience gives them a basis for common 
interests, the question then becomes, what are women’s interests.  What common points 
of interests can be determined to serve as the basis to effectively gauge and measure 
effectiveness of representation?  In this thesis, I look to the MDGs 3 and 5 issued by 
United Nations to serve as an appropriate solution to this theoretical dilemma.    
When the United Nations came together in 2000 and outlined the quantifiable 
indicators of MDGs 3 and 5, they subsequently provided a platform of women’s interests.  
These two goals, which are specifically attributed to women, operate on the assumption 
that their achievement will be beneficial to women.  The indicators for MDG 3, as 
mentioned previously, are defined and monitored as follows: the ratio of girls to boys in 
primary, secondary, and tertiary education, the share of women in wage employment in 
the non-agricultural sector, and the proportion of seats held by women in national 
parliament.  The indicators for MDG 5 are: the maternal mortality ratio and the 
proportion of births attended by skilled health professionals (mdgs.un.org).  I assert that 
these indicators outlined for the MDGs 3 and 5 provide a platform for women’s interests 
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on the assumption that they are common and central values to most women unilaterally.    
That is not to say, however, that women’s interests are limited solely to these indicators, 
but rather, that their selection by the UN affords them a level of credibility which makes 
them a desirable basis for empirical research.  
By defining women’s interest as the indicators for MDGs 3 and 5, we can begin to 
better understand and measure women representation.  With the MDGs 3 and 5 serving 
the purpose of the which for Beckwith’s framework, the focus then turns to where, who, 
and how.  In an attempt to understand these questions, this thesis focuses on women’s 
representation in legislature and representation expressed through women’s movements.  
In order to analyze these two variables, an understanding of the existing literature is 
required.  In addition to the general implications of the following literature, I further 
contextualize these arguments within a framework as they relate to the case study of 
Latin America.  
 
Women in Legislature 
A principal venue for women representation is embodied in legislature. With the 
‘which’ interests of Beckwith’s framework being established as MDGs 3 and 5, this 
section determines the ‘where’ these interests are promoted to be through representation 
in legislature.  The following literature then discusses the ‘who’ and ‘how’ questions of 
Beckwith’s framework.  Do women represent women? If they do, how, or rather how 
effective, are they in doing so in the legislature?   
Hanna Pitkin, defines descriptive representation, in politics, as “representation as 
‘standing for’ by resemblance, as being a copy of an original…” (11). The idea that 
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political assemblies should ‘mirror’ or reflect the demographics of the nation is popular 
in many democracies.  Descriptive representation is the goal of underrepresented groups, 
because their achievement of representation in government solidifies their presence in 
their respective society (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, Representation 19). 
However, many scholars argue that descriptive representation does not always translate 
into representation on behalf of that group. Because of this difference, whereas 
descriptive representation speaks to the physical make-up of legislature, substantive 
representation refers to the expression of a particular group’s interests by a representative 
from that group.  
Substantive representation shifts from the idea of simply ‘standing for’ a group or 
interests to ‘acting for’ a group and its interests (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 
Representation 23). That is not to say descriptive representation cannot translate into 
substantive representation, but rather that descriptive representation does not always 
equate to substantive representation.  The debate surrounding substantive representation 
focuses on recognizing when it is achieved.  What interests serve as the commonality 
between a group and its representative and how does that representative ‘act’ for it? 
Considering descriptive representation as the manifestation of Beckwith’s ‘who’, then 
substantive representation demonstrates ‘how’ or rather, ‘how’ effective these women in 
legislature are in successfully representing women and women’s interests.  This 
relationship between descriptive and substantive representation is key to understanding 
and determining women’s effective representation in the legislature.   
In relation to women’s representation, it is important, as Drude Dahlerup points 
out, to remember that, “not all women politicians want or are able to ‘represent women.’”  
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In situations where party ideologies are strong and instrumental, a woman legislator may 
be expected to vote along party lines, regardless of that policy’s effect on women.  In 
addition, if majorities of a woman legislator’s constituent’s support an issue that can 
negatively affect women, she may be obliged to vote in her constituents favor.  This issue 
of identity politics is considered a factor that potentially reduces women’s effectiveness 
to represent women and women’s interests in legislature.   
Despite these issues with identity politics, others argue both generally, and in the 
case for Latin America, that women do in fact represent women. Jane Mansbridge asserts 
that disadvantaged groups benefit from descriptive representation in at least four 
contexts.  Two of these contexts, Mansbridge argues, enhance substantive representation 
on behalf of that group.  The first context is when there is distrust of one group by 
another.  Historically subordinated groups will have difficulty trusting historically 
dominant groups to act on their behalf.  This distrust impairs communication between the 
two groups.  However, if the historically subordinated group elects their own 
representatives, their shared experience facilitates trust and vertical communication 
between these elected officials and their constituents (641). For example, in a study by 
Claudine Gay of U.S. citizens, she found that African Americans were more likely to 
contact their district representative if they were African American rather than if they were 
White (Gay 1996).  However, Elizabeth Haynes conducted a similar study with women 
and found that women were not more or less likely to contact their district representative 
if they were female (Haynes 1997).  This indicates that there may not be as strong of a 
relationship between women constituents and women politicians as compared to 
relationships formed on the basis of ethnicities, races, or classes (Mansbridge 642). 
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However, Mansbridge concludes, “the deeper the communicative chasm between a 
dominant and a subordinate group, the more descriptive representation is needed to 
bridge that chasm,” (643).  Based of this last assertion, I argue that Latin America’s 
degree of historical subordination of women, a relatively recent experience, makes the 
relationship between women voters and women representatives strong.  This in turn 
makes descriptive representation critical for the enhancement of their substantive 
representation.    
A second context where descriptive representation enhances substantive 
representation, Mansbrdige claims, is when issues are relatively uncrystallized.  
Uncrystallized issues are issues that are not fixed or definite.  These are issues that may 
have recently been added to a political agenda, or issues that have yet to emerge.  In these 
instances, Mansbridge says that descriptive representation permits these representatives 
to draw from their common experience and act on behalf of their constituents.  So, when 
uncrystallized issues occur, “a voter can expect the representative to react more or less 
the way the voter would have done, on the basis of descriptive similarity,” (644).  This is 
relevant to the case of Latin America because women redefined their roles in public and 
private spheres in the latter half of the twentieth century (Safa 355).  This recent change 
brings with it relatively new and rapidly evolving issues (that may be considered 
uncrystallized) concerning gender to the political agenda.  If this is the case, women of 
Latin America have a vested interest in voting for other women to represent them.   
The two other contexts in which disadvantaged groups benefit from descriptive 
representation come from its ability to construct social meaning and de facto legitimacy.  
Descriptive representation for disadvantaged groups shows that these groups matter and 
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are capable of ruling.  In addition, seeing themselves represented gives these groups a 
sense of involvement, as if they themselves were present in deliberations (Gosnell1948, 
131, cited in Pitkin [1967] 1972, 78; also Guinier 1994, 35, 39; Kymlicka 1993, 83; 
Minow 1991, 286 n. 69, 291; Phillips 1995).2  These sentiments or “feelings of being 
fairly or effectively represented” are otherwise referred to as symbolic representation 
(Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005, p. 407).3  Although descriptive representation and 
symbolic representation are categorized and defined discretely, this assertion implies that 
descriptive representation stimulates the sentiments of symbolic representation.  In a 
study by Barnes and Burchard of 20 African countries from 1998-2008, they found that 
as descriptive representation for women increased, so did women’s political engagement 
(784).  Their study demonstrates this relationship between descriptive and symbolic 
representation. This relationship implies that when women, on a civil level, see a 
concrete, percentage increase of women participation in legislature, they are more 
inclined to actively engage in politics.  This supports Mansbridge’s final two assertions 
supporting her overall conclusion that Blacks should represent Blacks and women should 
represent women.                   
Based on Mansbridge’s general assertions, I argue that descriptive representation 
in Latin America is key in obtaining substantive representation for women.  For a better 
understanding of women in legislature within a Latin American framework, I look to 
Leslie Schwindt-Bayer’s study.  Her study finds a general consistency across many Latin 
American states that women are significantly more likely to prioritize women’s issues.  
However, she argues, this is not necessarily a good thing.  She also notes that this 																																																								
2 Mansbridge 650 
3 Barnes and Burchard 769	
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phenomenon may be attributed to a form of political exclusion.  She infers that some 
legislatures have gender disparities that cause men to view issues involving childcare and 
family as women issues.  Because of this, they have a tendency to pass them off to other 
women in the legislature, marginalizing women’s power to those issues only concerned 
with family and childcare, reinforcing gender stereotypes.  However, as argued by Barnes 
and Burchard, increased percentages of descriptive representation leads to increased 
political engagement of women on a sociopolitical level.  This increased political 
engagement of women then closes the political engagement gender gap (767). Based on 
Mansbridge’s assertions and the study by Barnes and Burchard, it may be argued that as 
descriptive representation and political engagement for women increases, so will their 
ability to overcome political exclusion.   
Mansbridge calls to attention the situations in which descriptive representation 
thrives and is optimal to translate into substantive representation.  Her contextual 
scenario resonates with the political climate of Latin America during the last few decades 
of the twentieth century.  Arguably, this descriptive representation was achieved through 
gender quotas that were established following the regime changes.  Given the historical 
social and political subordination of women in Latin America, I argue that women in this 
region are advocates for other women and are critical in the promotion of women’s 
interests.  This, in conjunction with Schwindt-Bayer’s study that women promote women 
issues, provides the reasoning for my first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
I expect to find a higher proportion (percentage) of women in parliament in those Latin 
American countries that have experienced greater achievement of MDGs 3 and 5.  
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This hypothesis also provides additional implications concerning gender quotas 
and the critical mass theory (explained below). The prevalence of women’s movements 
in some countries in Latin America ensured women’s inclusion/incorporation into the 
new transitioning governments.  When forming these new governments, countries such as 
Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru promised and enacted gender quotas to ensure women’s 
presence in the new legislatures (Jones, Alles, and Tchintian 341). Whether these gender 
quotas served as a proxy to appease these women protestors and activists is controlled for 
and analyzed in the Chapter IV data model.  The resulting data may point to further 
implications to arguments about women in legislature and the critical mass theory.  
 
Gender Quotas  
The three types of quota policies are: party quotas, reserved seats quotas, and 
legislative quotas.  According to Mona Lena Krook, party quotas policies “aim to 
increase the proportion of women among individual parties’ candidates and generally 
mandate between 10 and 50 percent of women.”  Reserved seats, on the other hand, call 
for the reservation of a percentage of seats, ranging from 1 to 10 percent, to be assigned 
specifically to women.  Legislative quotas, also known as candidate quotas, mandate that 
political parties nominate a proportion of women, typically spanning between 5 and 50% 
(347).  The latter, having appeared in the 1990s, tend to be found more commonly in 
developing countries and in post-conflict societies, namely Latin America and Southeast 
Asia.     
The goal of gender quotas is to not only increase the number of women 
representatives in legislature, but to empower women in all aspects of the society 
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(Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005; Htun and Jones 2002; Kudva 2003; United Nations 
1995).  That being said, proper implementation of these quotas is imperative.  The 
legitimacy, effectiveness, and implementation of these quotas depend on the actors who 
are advocating for them and their motivations for doing so.  From Krook’s case study, 
she concludes that three broad groups of actors in gender quota implementation are: civil 
society, the state, and international/transnational spheres (351).  In addition, she finds that 
the following seven motivations for quota reform range from: principled stands, electoral 
considerations, empty gestures, promotion of other political ends, extensions of 
representational guarantees, international pressure, and transnational learning (352).  
These motivations, though not all good, will be key in determining why (or why not) 
gender quotas are effective on a case-by-case basis.   
Debates on gender quotas focus on whether or not they are productive or 
counterproductive to the empowerment of women. Despite the aforementioned 
motivations for gender quota implementation ranging from ‘appearance-sake’ motives to 
validated motives, proponents of gender quota implementation argue that these policies 
still provide women access to power not previously available (Jones, Alles, and Tchintian 
348).  Others argue that these quotas reduce women’s actual and perceived effectiveness 
as political actors (Goetz and Hassim 2003; Rinker 2006), that they reinforce rather than 
challenge the status quo (Htun 2002; Meier 2000), and that they place a ceiling on 
women participation in legislature (Zetterberg 718).      
In 1991, Argentina became the first Latin American country to pass legislation on 
gender quotas.   Shortly after, Argentina’s candidate quota system quickly disseminated 
throughout the Latin American region (Araújo and García 2006).  Because of this rapid 
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and widespread adoption of gender quotas in Latin America, this region is at the forefront 
of various empirical studies analyzing gender quota effectiveness and women 
representation.  Generally, these quotas are enacted by male-dominated legislatures as the 
result of women’s groups inside and outside the parties (Htun and Jones 2002; Lokar 
2003; Tripp, Konate, and Lowe-Morna 2006).  This is important, because the question of 
who advocates and through what venues for these gender quotas is relevant to the broader 
understanding of women’s movements and representation.  Applying the discussion 
about gender quotas to the case of Latin America will help to provide insight into their 
modes of implementation and effectiveness in achieving MDGs 3 and 5.  What effect do 
gender quotas actually have in promoting women representation in legislature? Also, any 
correlation between gender quotas and relative success of MDGs 3 and 5 may call for 
more discussion concerning their relevance and influence on the critical mass debate. 
 
Critical Mass Debate 
The idea that descriptive representation leads to substantive representation is a 
controversy among scholars.  From this central assertion stems the question of how much 
descriptive representation is sufficient to translate into substantive representation.  This 
notion of a “critical mass” maintains that: “it takes a certain minimum representation, 
[…], before the minority, here women, are able to make a substantial difference in 
politics,” (Dahlerup 518). 
Behind the “critical mass” theory is the idea of the ‘politics of presence,’ which is 
that with increased women’s presence, women have the increased likelihood of initiating 
policy change for their group (Grey 492).  A study done by Rosabeth Moss Kanter found 
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that when a minority reached the threshold of 15% in legislature, they were “tokens,” 
known as skewed groups.  In addition, when these minority groups reached between 
15%-40% membership, they were considered as “becoming strong enough to begin to 
influence the culture of the group,” (Grey 494). 
In relation to the supporters of the “critical mass” theory is the case study done by 
Sandra Grey.  In her study of women in New Zealand parliament, she found that while 
women mobilized more effectively when they were of ‘sufficient size,’ and in a 
supportive environment, they reached “a point at which a new set of inhibitors, some 
linked to numerical strength, took hold.” In addition, with the rise of women in 
parliament came “overt hostility towards feminist agendas” (Grey 499).  Although there 
was not a critical number that forced a backlash to women-oriented policies, it stands to 
show that multiple factors and influences affect the descriptive representation of women 
in legislature.  
In addition to these two views, Dahlerup argues that instead of focusing on a 
critical mass perspective, there needs to be a shift to “focus on critical acts that will 
empower women in general, for example, gender quotas.”  She hypothesizes that the 
proportion of women in political institution, is more important when it comes to the 
content of the political decisions, or the politics as a workplace rather than actual policy 
outcomes (518). 
These scholars call attention to various factors that influence the critical mass 
theory.  While analyzing the data for any positive (or negative) correlations between 
representation of women in legislature and relative success for the MDGs 3 and 5, it is 
important to keep in mind these critiques of the critical mass as they interact with the 
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implementation of gender quotas.  That is to say, if gender quotas do in fact have an 
influence on the achievement of MDGs 3 and 5, investigation into these quotas’ 
percentage requirements may provide empirical evidence for the critical mass theory.  
 
Women Representation through Social Movements 
Social movements are an alternative to institutionalized methods of 
representation. A social movement is, “a form of political organization in which 
membership and action is based on a shared sense of purpose and/or identity, aimed at 
changing social practices or prevailing power relations” (Mcbride and Mazur 2008; 
Meyer et al. 2005; Tarrow 1998).4  In many instances, social movements are viewed as 
key catalysts in changing power dynamics of a state. The targets of social movements can 
vary.  Modern social movements not only target the state, but they target other entities as 
well, such as educational organizations and private employers (Dyke, Soule, and Taylor 
28). As social movements recognize their potential to initiate change in a variety of 
arenas, they may become a preferred avenue of representation. The question remains, 
however, why and when do these movements occur? 
When it comes to women and social movements, it is important to recognize that 
women are the principal actors, serving to answer Beckwith’s question of ‘who?’  In 
order for the social movement to be specifically identified as a women’s movement, a 
gendered identity claim must be the basis for the movement.  This identity claim may be 
manifested into an identity as women, mothers, or daughters (Beckwith 324). 
In considering women movements as an effective and sustaining venue of 
representation, the why and when these movements occur are significant.  In a study by 																																																								
4 Weldon, Protest Makes Policy 12 
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Murdie and Peksen, they find that women’s protests, a manifestation of women’s 
movements, is more likely to occur when there is a lack of respect for women’s basic 
rights as well as when there is greater resource mobilization (190). In a study done by 
Paxton, Hughes, and Green, they found empirical evidence to support their hypothesis 
that in the presence of international pressure, spurred by international women’s 
movements, institutionalized women’s equality occurred. In their study they found that 
formation of women’s non-governmental organizations, along with other international 
groups, put pressure on governments to adopt more women-oriented agendas.  This was 
monitored by increased participation in women’s organizations and increased 
participation of women in legislatures in numerous countries (916).  In addition to these 
factors, women’s movement discourse also acknowledges “domestic characteristics” of 
the nations and their key roles in determining women’s ability to acquire influential 
political power (916). 
According to Ray and Korteweg, the two conceptualizations under which women 
mobilize are either ‘structural and universal’ or ‘historically and locationally specific’ 
(52).  The first conceptualization attributes women’s mobilization to the rise of 
urbanization, industrialization, and education (Chafetz & Dworkin 1986, Margolis 1993; 
Papanek 1993).5  More recently, support for the ‘structural and universal’ 
conceptualization has shifted for the ‘historically and locationally specific’ 
conceptualization of preconditions to women’s mobilization.  The latter approach 
determines that political, local, and historically contingent processes are responsible for 
the formation and articulation of women’s interests and mobilization (Ray and Korteweg 
53).  With respect to the second conceptualization, Beckwith hypothesizes that 																																																								
5 Ray and Korteweg 52	
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movements in general come about when a group of individuals mobilize in response to 
what they see as a stigmatized system with unequal power distributions (Meyer and 
Tarrow 1988).6 In this light, women in social movements are bound together by their 
identity and organize against civil society, whose actors generally consist of elites and 
state authorities. 
The studies by Murdie and Peksen, as well as Paxton, Hughes, and Green 
respectively determine that women’s movements are likely to occur when women’s rights 
are marginalized and under factors of international influence.  In addition to these factors, 
the historic conditions and domestic characteristics of the nation also play a key role in 
influencing women mobilization.  Given that the conceptualization of these movements 
are ‘historically and locationally specific’, it is important to contextualize and understand 
women’s movement theory within a Latin American framework.   
Understanding the environments that promote and mobilize women to create 
movements is noteworthy, especially in the context of Latin America.  Women in Latin 
America began mobilizing in the face of authoritarian dictatorships that were prevalent 
following WWII (Stephen 5).  The unequal power distribution amid women 
subordination in these largely male-dominated societies, along with government 
repression, led women to find solidarity among each other and mobilize for change and 
answers.  During this period, known as the Dirty Wars, the political oppression allowed 
women’s movements to “achieve a high profile” outside of the male-dominated political 
sphere, because government suppression of political activity created a new and necessary 
“political space,” (Waylen 573).  Throughout this period, disappearances of many 
women’s loved ones drove women to collectively organize around their identities as 																																																								6	Beckwith,	Mapping	Strategic	Engagements,	314	
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mothers and wives to demand answers from the repressive regimes.  Groups such as the 
Madres de la Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, the Group of Relatives of the Detained-
Disappeared in Chile, as well as the Mutual Support Group (GAM) in Guatemala gained 
prominence and recognition (Ray and Korteweg 54).  As movements begun to spring up 
across the region, women began to blur the sphere between the women-led domestic life 
and the male-dominated political life (Stephen 8).  
These women’s movements in Latin America played key roles in challenging 
gender hierarchies. The question now turns to how effective have these women’s 
movements been in promoting their interests since their formation?  Common arguments 
against effectiveness of social movements claim, “identity politics divides movements 
and reduces their political effectiveness,” (Gitlin 1995; Tarrow 1998; Taylor and Whittier 
1999; Echols 1989; Harvey 1996). Previously mentioned as an issue to women in 
legislature as well, issues concerning identity politics leads to the splintering of women’s 
movements, arguably decreasing their overall effectiveness.  However, as previously 
noted, because of Latin America’s prior experience with gender roles, women “legitimize 
their concerns over issues such as human rights or the cost of living primarily in terms of 
their roles as wives and mothers,” (Safa 356). The mixing of political and social spheres 
through women mobilization during the post-WWII authoritarian regimes, presented an 
opportunity for women to take action politically when the transitions from authoritarian 
to democratic governments occurred.  This action and mobilization by women 
transcended political parties and class.  
In addition to issues with identity politics, others questioned whether, following 
the democratization of Latin America, these women’s movements would find a need and 
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space to continue operating.  Considering this question, it is important to form a broader 
understanding of the potential and scope of women’s movements.  Laura Weldon and 
Maura Bahu, claim that women’s movements influence policy agendas, change public 
opinion, and raise awareness (Weldon, Protest Makes Policy 129).  In addition, in 
another study done by Weldon, she finds a positive correlation between women’s 
movements and policy outcomes on violence against women. She uses this study to 
support her theoretical argument that, “social movements, even more than political 
parties or legislators, provide critical avenues of substantive representation for 
marginalized groups such as women…” (57).  As seen in Weldon’s study, social 
movements may prove to be a better avenue for advocating women’s interests and 
creating effective change.  Social movements allow an alternative space for individuals, 
in this case women, to create a group conscience that allows them to identify their 
problems and spur collective action to resolve them (81).  Recognizing that women’s 
movement do not just target the balance of power and state authority is imperative in 
recognizing the importance of their continued existence.  In addition to Weldon’s study, 
proponents of modern movements acknowledge that they target other entities, “such as 
religious, medical, and educational organizations, professional associations, and private 
employers,” (Dyke, Soule, and Taylor 28). The continued existence of women’s 
movements in Latin America, along with this understanding, acknowledges their ability 
to still exercise meaningful influence.  
The historical significance and importance of women movements in Latin 
America in challenging gender-hierarchies, along with the theoretical arguments in their 
favor, leads me to the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2: 
I expect to find a positive correlation with the meeting of MDGs 3 and 5 in countries 
where women’s movement presence is strong and autonomous. 
 
Conclusion 
When it comes to understanding women representation, there are a multitude of 
theoretical factors to consider.  This thesis uses MDGs 3 and 5 as a working definition for 
women’s interests and uses their indicators as a gauge.  Women representation in 
legislature and women representation through social movements are the venues of focus 
in this thesis.  These two venues were selected on their specific relevance to the case 
study of Latin American countries.   
Latin America has a shared history of social grass-root movements as well as 
relatively high women participation in legislature.  The progress of Latin American 
countries in incorporating women involvement in legislature is noteworthy.  This thesis 
will attempt to discover the level of correlation between each country’s relative success 
in the achievement of MDGs 3 and 5 and the level of participation of women in both the 
legislature and the social setting.  It is intended that through an analysis of this data, more 
information surrounding each venue and a broader understanding of the dynamics of 
women representation may be learned.  
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Chapter III: Research Design 
I define women’s interests as the indicators to MDG 3: To Promote Gender 
Equality and Empower Women and MDG 5: Improve Maternal Health.  Each of these 
goals has specific target objectives as well as quantifiable indicators, which will be 
discussed in detail.  This data strives to identify a correlation (or lack thereof) between 
these goals and the relative progress/development towards them in Latin America. Latin 
America’s recent progress in women representation in legislature, despite its historically 
patriarchal society, provides a unique case study opportunity to identify their 
characteristics of change.  
For my research data set, I have selected the following 22 Latin American 
countries: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  All available 
data for these 22 countries are collected across the time period 1990-2015.  It is important 
to acknowledge that, for various indicators, data for certain countries may not be able.  
To account for this, I identify the countries that have limited or no data, as appropriate, 
for each indicator.     
In order to answer my research question, I first identify which countries have 
experienced success and/or notable changes over time (1990-2015).  I define and explain, 
in detail, the indicators for MDGs 3 and 5.  In addition, I explain how progress for that 
indicator is determined and evaluated. Following each explanation, I present and analyze 
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the related descriptive statistics for each country for that particular indicator.  In each 
table, the country’s mean, average change, standard deviation, max, min, and number of 
observations are provided.  Countries with comparatively few observations for a given 
indicator are taken into consideration when evaluating relative and comparative progress.  
For each indicator, countries that have achieved the explicit target, if given, are 
identified.  In my analysis of these descriptive statistics tables, I identify the countries 
that have successfully achieved each indicator, the countries with significant change over 
time, and countries with the lowest, comparative success.  In the following section, 
Chapter IV, a separate analysis involving the manipulation of the women in legislature 
and women’s movements variables is done for the Latin American countries.  
 
MDG 3: Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women 
The United Nations site for the MDG indicators, established in the year 2000 and 
amended in 2008, lists the sole target for MDG 3 as Target 3.A: Eliminate gender 
disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of 
education no later than 2015.  The indicators for monitoring progress of this target are: 
ratios of girls to boys in primary, secondary, and tertiary education, share of women in 
wage employment in the non-agricultural sector, and proportion of seats held by women 
in parliament.   
The first indicator for this MDG is the ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary, 
and tertiary education.  The UN defines this indicator as follows:  
Ratio of girls to boys (gender parity index) in primary, secondary and tertiary 
education is the ratio of the number of female students enrolled at primary, 
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secondary and tertiary levels of education to the number of male students in each 
level. To standardise the effects of the population structure of the appropriate age 
groups, the Gender Parity Index (GPI) of the Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) for 
each level of education is used (mdgs.un.org).  
The ratio of girls to boys in the levels of education is determined by the gender parity 
index.  This is calculated as the ratio of the number of female students enrolled at 
primary, secondary and tertiary levels of education to the number of male students in 
each level. Achievement for this indicator is achieved when the gender parity index is 
between .97 and 1.03. Thus, in the data set, countries within this range are considered to 
have eliminated gender disparity. In addition, the data isolates each level of education 
(primary, secondary, tertiary). The source of this data in the data set comes from the 
World Bank DataBank.  The World Bank cites UNESCO Institute for Statistics as its 
source for the data.  Breakdowns of countries gender parities can be found in Table 3.1 
for primary, Table 3.2 for secondary, and Table 3.3 for tertiary.  
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Mean Mean	Δ S.D. Max Min
Country:
Argentina 0.99 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.98 19
Belize 0.97 0.00 0.01 1.00 0.95 22
Bolivia 0.98 0.00 0.02 1.00 0.93 23
Brazil 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.95 0.94 7
Chile 0.97 0.00 0.01 0.98 0.95 20
Colombia 1.00 -0.01 0.04 1.15 0.97 19
Costa	Rica 0.99 0.00 0.01 1.00 0.98 23
Cuba 0.97 0.00 0.01 1.00 0.96 24
Dominican	Republic 0.94 -0.01 0.04 1.01 0.86 14
Ecuador	 1.00 0.00 0.01 1.01 0.99 20
El	Salvador 0.97 0.00 0.01 1.00 0.96 22
Guatemala 0.90 0.00 0.04 0.97 0.86 21
Guyana 1.02 0.01 0.06 1.13 0.94 18
Honduras 1.00 0.00 0.01 1.04 0.99 22
Mexico 0.97 0.00 0.02 1.00 0.93 23
Nicaragua 1.01 0.00 0.03 1.07 0.97 20
Panama 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.96 16
Paraguay 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.96 22
Peru 0.99 0.00 0.01 1.00 0.97 20
Suriname 0.99 -0.01 0.04 1.10 0.94 14
Uruguay 0.98 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.97 21
Venezuela 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.97 20
Source:	World	Bank:	United	Nations	Educational,	Scientific,	and	Cultural	Organization	
(UNESCO)	
Table	3.1:	MDG	3	Indicator:	Ratio	of	Girls	to	Boys	in	Primary	Education	(1990-2014)	
No.	
Observation
 
Mean Mean	Δ S.D. Max Min
Country:
Argentina 1.09 0.00 0.03 1.14 1.03 17
Belize 1.06 0.00 0.02 1.09 1.01 17
Bolivia 0.97 0.01 0.02 1.00 0.93 14
Brazil 1.10 0.00 0.00 1.11 1.10 4
Chile 1.03 0.00 0.01 1.06 1.01 18
Colombia 1.11 -0.01 0.04 1.20 1.05 19
Costa	Rica 1.07 0.00 0.02 1.12 1.05 23
Cuba 1.05 0.00 0.06 1.17 0.98 23
Dominican	Republic 1.18 -0.01 0.05 1.24 1.12 12
Ecuador	 1.02 0.00 0.01 1.05 1.00 16
El	Salvador 1.02 0.00 0.04 1.12 0.97 19
Guatemala 0.90 0.00 0.02 0.93 0.84 16
Guyana 1.07 0.02 0.06 1.15 1.00 9
Honduras 1.23 0.00 0.02 1.27 1.22 8
Mexico 1.02 0.00 0.03 1.08 0.97 23
Nicaragua 1.15 0.00 0.03 1.19 1.10 11
Panama 1.08 0.00 0.01 1.09 1.05 15
Paraguay 1.04 0.00 0.01 1.07 1.01 21
Peru 0.96 0.00 0.02 0.99 0.93 18
Suriname 1.27 0.00 0.06 1.39 1.19 13
Uruguay 1.15 -0.01 0.07 1.33 0.99 15
Venezuela 1.15 -0.01 0.06 1.25 1.09 18
Table	3.2:	MDG	3	Indicator:	Ratio	of	Girls	to	Boys	in	Secondary	Education	(1990-2014)	
No.	
Observation
Source:	World	Bank:	United	Nations	Educational,	Scientific,	and	Cultural	Organization	
(UNESCO)  
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Mean Mean	Δ S.D. Max Min
Country:
Argentina 1.52 -0.01 0.05 1.64 1.42 14
Belize 1.64 0.00 0.06 1.71 1.51 13
Bolivia 0.84 0.84 0.84 1
Brazil 1.21 0.01 0.11 1.32 1.06 13
Chile 0.96 0.01 0.09 1.12 0.85 19
Colombia 1.08 0.01 0.04 1.14 0.99 19
Costa	Rica 1.26 -0.01 0.02 1.28 1.24 4
Cuba 1.50 0.01 0.19 1.83 1.13 24
Dominican	Republic 1.51 0.02 0.14 1.60 1.35 3
Ecuador	 1.23 0.04 0.11 1.31 1.15 2
El	Salvador 1.12 0.01 0.07 1.17 0.94 18
Guatemala 0.92 0.03 0.17 1.04 0.72 3
Guyana 1.61 0.04 0.68 2.47 0.72 14
Honduras 1.15 0.02 0.29 1.51 0.75 15
Mexico 0.93 0.01 0.06 0.98 0.79 20
Nicaragua 1.04 -0.01 0.06 1.10 0.96 6
Panama 1.62 0.00 0.07 1.74 1.52 16
Paraguay 1.31 0.01 0.16 1.43 0.85 13
Peru 1.05 0.01 0.04 1.09 0.98 7
Suriname 1.47 0.04 0.35 1.72 1.22 2
Uruguay 1.81 -0.01 0.11 2.03 1.68 13
Venezuela 1.33 -0.03 0.30 1.69 1.07 4
No.	
Observation
Source:	World	Bank:	United	Nations	Educational,	Scientific,	and	Cultural	Organization	
(UNESCO)
Table	3.3:	MDG	3	Indicator:	Ratio	of	Girls	to	Boys	in	Tertiary	Education	(1990-2014)	
 
 As noted earlier, the objective of this indicator is to end gender disparity in all 
levels of education by 2015.  This is recognized when the gender parity index is between 
.97-1.03.  For the primary level of education, many countries began with an index very 
close to and in-between .97-1.03.  According to the goal of the indicator, all countries, 
except Brazil, succeeded in ending gender disparity for primary education.  There were 
no significant changes in any particular country.  Similarly, for secondary education all 
countries, except Guatemala, succeeded in ending gender disparity at this level of 
education.  Additionally, all countries, except Bolivia, were successful in eliminating 
gender disparity in tertiary education.  However, it should be noted that Bolivia had only 
one data observation and it was for the year 2007.  Bolivia may have made progress since 
this year, but the World Bank DataBank does not provide data supporting or discrediting 
this. Countries of particular interest in this data set are Chile, Guatemala, Guyana, 
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Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Paraguay because they had comparatively lower 
index minimums and still reached (some exceeded) the target gender parity index.          
The second indicator for MDG is the share of women in wage employment in the 
non-agricultural sector.  The UN defines non-agricultural sector and wage employment in 
relation to this indicator as follows: 
The non-agricultural sector includes industry and services. ‘Industry’ includes 
mining and quarrying (including oil production), manufacturing, construction, 
electricity, gas, and water7… ‘Services’ include wholesale and retail trade and 
restaurants and hotels; transport, storage, and communications; financing, 
insurance, real estate, and business services; and community, social, and personal 
services.8 
And  
Wage employment refers only to wage earners and salaried employees, or 
"persons in paid employment jobs". Employees are typically remunerated by 
wages and salaries, but may be paid by commission from sales, piece-rates, 
bonuses or payments in kind such as food, housing, training, etc (mdgs.un.org)9 
The share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector is expressed as a 
percentage.  Women’s participation in this work force sector is taken as the number of 
women in paid employment in non-agricultural sector over the total number of persons in 
paid employment in non-agricultural sector, expressed as a percentage. Thus, in the data 																																																								7Corresponding to divisions 2-5 in the International Standard Industrial Classification of All 
Economic Activities (ISIC-Rev.21) and to tabulation categories C-F in ISIC-Rev. 31.	8	Corresponding to divisions 6-9 in ISIC-Rev. 2, and to tabulation categories G-Q in ISIC-Rev. 3	
9 These persons are in wage employment as opposed to self-employment – that is employers, own-account 
workers, members of producers' cooperatives and contributing family workers. The different statuses in 
employment are defined according to the ILO Resolution concerning the International Classification of 
Status in Employment (ICSE),3 adopted by the 15th ICLS (1993). 
	 	 		
31		
set, the closer a country is to 50%, the closer they are to achieving equality for this 
indicator.  The source for this data was taken from the World Bank DataBank who cites 
the International Labour Organization (ILO), Key Indicators of the Labour Market 
database as their source for the data. Table 3.4 contains the data for the share of women 
in the non-agricultural sector. 
Mean Mean	Δ S.D. Min Max
Country:
Argentina 41.83 0.26 2.97 36.60 45.90 23
Belize 34.48 0.15 1.53 32.70 37.70 12
Bolivia 36.78 0.24 1.93 34.20 42.40 18
Brazil 45.48 0.25 2.11 40.20 47.40 16
Chile 35.82 0.07 2.14 31.70 39.00 24
Colombia 46.33 0.20 2.00 41.80 50.10 24
Costa	Rica 39.60 0.27 2.30 36.30 43.40 24
Cuba 43.04 0.17 0.83 42.00 44.80 16
Dominican	Republic 36.63 0.48 3.57 31.30 41.60 22
Ecuador	 36.05 0.36 3.35 30.90 40.20 19
El	Salvador 32.47 0.16 2.02 28.70 36.70 18
Guatemala 33.39 1.28 3.86 28.90 38.40 7
Guyana 36.60 -0.76 2.69 34.70 38.50 2
Honduras 41.88 -0.03 0.79 40.60 43.20 13
Mexico 37.88 0.20 1.62 34.90 40.30 21
Nicaragua 38.62 -0.35 0.54 38.10 39.50 5
Panama 43.00 0.03 0.72 41.70 44.60 21
Paraguay 40.58 0.28 1.71 37.70 44.20 19
Peru 33.34 0.47 2.53 29.00 37.60 18
Suriname 37.22 -0.17 1.63 34.70 41.00 11
Uruguay 46.79 0.10 2.16 42.30 49.30 14
Venezuela 39.78 0.37 2.93 34.70 43.70 24
No.	
Observation
Table	3.4:	MDG	3	Indicator:	Share	of	Women	in	Wage	Employment	in	the	Non-Agricultural	
Sector	(1990-2014)
Source:	World	Bank:	International	Labour	Organization,	Key	Indicators	of	the	Labour	Market	
database.  
As mentioned previously, an equal share in this sector between men and women 
would mean that each constitutes roughly half (50%) of the wage-employment.  The three 
countries that closely approach 50% are Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay.  The Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru, however, have the largest average change for 
this indicator.  Although they may not have the largest percentage, it is significant to note 
their relative progress.   They may not achieve the target by their specified date, but this 
large average change indicates the possibility that greater socio-political factors are in 
motion affecting and spurring progress.  
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The final indicator for MDG 3 is the proportion of seats held by women in 
parliament.  This indicator is represented as a percentage and is defined by the UN as:  
The proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments is the number of 
seats held by women members in single or lower chambers of national 
parliaments, expressed as a percentage of all occupied seats. National parliaments 
can be bicameral or unicameral. This indicator covers the single chamber in 
unicameral parliaments and the lower chamber in bicameral parliaments.10 Seats 
are usually won by members in general parliamentary elections.11 Seats refer to 
the number of parliamentary mandates, or the number of members of parliament 
(mdgs.un.org). 
This proportion is calculated by dividing the number of seats held by women by the total 
number of seats available in national parliament.  As with the previous indicator, the 
closer a country is to reaching 50% defines their relative success at achieving gender 
equality and empowerment.  The source for this data also comes from World Bank 
DataBank who takes their data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) as their source.  
Table 3.5 contains the descriptive statistics for this indicator.  
																																																								
10 It does not cover the upper chamber of bicameral parliaments. 
11 Seats may also be filled by nomination, appointment, indirect election, rotation of members and by-
election.	
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Mean Mean	Δ S.D. Min Max
Country:
Argentina 32.67 0.73 8.36 6.30 40.00 16
Belize 3.71 0.01 2.77 0.00 6.90 19
Bolivia 20.26 2.62 9.98 9.20 53.10 17
Brazil 7.82 0.19 1.40 5.30 9.90 19
Chile 13.06 0.49 2.19 7.50 15.80 18
Colombia 11.23 0.54 3.07 4.50 19.90 18
Costa	Rica 30.56 1.01 9.60 10.50 38.60 19
Cuba 36.45 1.36 8.11 22.80 48.90 19
Dominican	Republic 17.66 0.54 3.46 7.50 20.80 19
Ecuador	 22.48 2.18 10.88 3.70 41.60 18
El	Salvador 16.22 0.69 5.76 9.50 27.40 19
Guatemala 10.50 0.09 2.38 7.00 13.30 19
Guyana 27.47 0.67 5.86 18.30 36.90 17
Honduras 15.46 0.96 7.25 5.50 25.80 18
Mexico 23.12 1.31 7.57 12.00 37.40 19
Nicaragua 21.96 1.50 11.10 9.70 42.40 18
Panama 11.77 0.58 4.00 7.50 19.30 18
Paraguay 8.99 0.71 4.83 2.50 17.50 18
Peru 19.81 0.52 7.13 5.60 29.20 18
Suriname 17.32 -0.22 6.02 7.80 25.50 18
Uruguay 11.64 0.51 2.52 6.10 16.20 19
Venezuela 13.77 0.69 4.54 5.90 18.60 18
Source:	World	Bank:	Inter-Parliamentary	Union	(IPU)	(www.ipu.org)
No.	
Observation
Table	3.5:	MDG	3	Indicator:	Proportion	of	Seats	held	by	Women	in	National	Parliament	
(1990-2014)
 
Achievement for this indicator is tracked by its relative progress as well as how 
high/close their percentage is to reaching 50%.  The countries with the highest maximum 
percentage over these years are Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua.  For this 
indicator, it is also significant to pay attention to those countries with the highest average 
change and highest mean.  The highest average change countries represent those 
countries that, since 1990, have, per year, experienced the greatest change.  This factor 
may point to significant socio-political factors, such as gender quotas or public 
mobilization, as an explanation for that country’s increased representation of women in 
legislature.  The countries with the highest average change are Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, 
Mexico, and Nicaragua.  In addition, those countries with the highest mean are important 
in showing which countries have maintained high levels of representation throughout the 
time series.  This may serve as an indicator to show that these countries have established 
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and incorporated a high level of women representation in legislature.  The countries with 
the highest mean are Argentina, Cuba, Costa Rica, Guyana, and Nicaragua.   
 
MDG 5: Improve Maternal Health  
The targets for this development goal are two fold. The first, target 5.A: Reduce 
by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio.  The second is 
target 5.B, is to achieve, by 2015, universal access to reproductive health. The first target, 
target 5.A, has two identified indicators for progress: maternal mortality ratio (MMR) and 
the proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel.  The UN as defines the first 
indicator, the MMR, as: 
the ratio of the number of maternal deaths during a given time period per 100,000 
live births during the same time-period. A maternal death refers to a female death 
from any cause related to or aggravated by pregnancy or its management 
(excluding accidental or incidental causes) during pregnancy and childbirth or 
within 42 days of termination of pregnancy, irrespective of the duration and site 
of the pregnancy (mdgs.un.org). 
This number is calculated by dividing the recorded/estimated number of maternal deaths 
by the total recorded/estimated number of live births in the same period and is then 
multiplied by 100,000.  Relative success of this indicator is seen if a country’s MMR 
from the year 1990 is lowered by 75 percent by the year 2015.  The source for this data 
comes form the World Bank DataBank who pulls their data from the WHO, UNICEF, 
UNFPA, and the United Nations Population Division.  Table 3.6 contains the descriptive 
statistics for this indicator. 
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Mean Mean	Δ S.D. Min Max
Country:
Argentina 68.17 -0.22 5.78 60.00 76.00 6
Belize 67.33 -1.60 26.88 35.00 110.00 6
Bolivia 326.67 -13.20 119.11 200.00 510.00 6
Brazil 85.83 -2.01 20.66 68.00 120.00 6
Chile 32.67 -1.37 12.64 22.00 55.00 6
Colombia 96.00 -0.73 18.37 81.00 130.00 6
Costa	Rica 40.67 0.13 5.13 33.00 46.00 6
Cuba 68.83 0.68 8.93 60.00 80.00 6
Dominican	Republic 150.00 -6.40 51.38 100.00 240.00 6
Ecuador	 114.17 -3.00 28.17 87.00 160.00 6
El	Salvador 83.00 -1.69 16.54 69.00 110.00 6
Guatemala 178.33 -5.20 54.56 140.00 270.00 6
Guyana 233.33 2.13 13.66 210.00 250.00 6
Honduras 168.33 -6.80 66.76 120.00 290.00 6
Mexico 63.00 -1.51 17.08 47.00 88.00 6
Nicaragua 133.33 -3.07 28.05 100.00 170.00 6
Panama 86.33 -0.44 6.98 79.00 98.00 6
Paraguay 121.67 -0.80 9.83 110.00 130.00 6
Peru 156.50 -6.73 66.13 89.00 250.00 6
Suriname 105.50 1.31 39.23 39.00 150.00 6
Uruguay 30.00 -1.36 9.94 14.00 42.00 6
Venezuela 99.33 0.68 8.57 91.00 110.00 6
Source:	World	Bank:	Mortality:	1990	to	2013.	Geneva,	World	Health	Organization,	2014
No.	
Observation
Table	3.6:	MDG	5	Indicator:	Maternal	Mortality	Ratio	(1990-2013)
 
As mentioned previously, the UN outlines an explicit target for this indicator, to 
decrease from the year 1990 the MMR by 75% by 2015.  To account for this explicit 
target, an extra column is added to the end of the descriptive statistics table for this 
indicator.  This column expresses the percentage of change between the beginning year 
1990, and the year with the most recent data, which for all the countries is 2013.  A 
positive percentage indicates the percent by which the country lowered their MMR from 
the year 1990 to the year 2013.  Although no country reached 75% (important to note that 
last available data set covered only until 2013), the countries that came the closest to it 
are Bolivia, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay.  Another notable column for this indicator is the 
mean change.  Countries with negative change indicate a decreasing MMR over the time 
series.  The countries with significant mean change are Bolivia, Dominican Republic, 
Honduras, and Peru.            
	 	 		
36		
On the other hand, countries that have positive mean changes and negative 
percentage changes indicate an increase in MMR.  This is the opposite of the desired 
outcome for this indicator.  The countries that experienced an overall increase in their 
MMR are Cuba, Guyana, Suriname, and Venezuela.   
The second and final indicator for target A of MDG 5 is the proportion of births 
attended by skilled health personnel. The UN defines this indicator as: 
The percentage of deliveries attended by health personnel trained in providing life 
saving obstetric care, including giving the necessary supervision, care and advice 
to women during pregnancy, labour and the post-partum period; conducting 
deliveries on their own; and caring for newborns. Traditional birth attendants, 
even if they receive a short training course, are not included (mdgs.un.org). 
The method of computation takes the number of women aged 15-49 with a live birth 
attended by a skilled health personnel (doctors, nurses or midwives) during delivery and 
expresses this as a percentage of women aged 15-49 with a live birth in the same period. 
To gauge relative success for this indicator, countries with the highest percentage indicate 
greater number of births attended by skilled health personnel.  The source of this data 
also comes from the World Bank DataBank who collets this data from UNICEF, State of 
the World’s Children, ChildInfo, and Demographic and Health Surveys.  Table 3.7 
contains the descriptive statistics for this indicator.   
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Mean Mean	Δ S.D. Min Max
Country:
Argentina 97.68 0.03 1.50 94.80 99.40 15.00
Belize 90.15 1.83 7.62 76.90 100.00 14.00
Bolivia 65.19 1.33 11.41 47.20 84.04 7.00
Brazil 90.87 1.16 11.14 69.50 98.08 6.00
Chile 99.71 0.03 0.14 99.40 99.85 16.00
Colombia 91.84 1.01 7.38 80.60 99.30 8.00
Costa	Rica 98.59 0.05 0.56 98.00 99.26 9.00
Cuba 99.90 0.01 0.04 99.80 100.00 11.00
Dominican	Republic 96.51 0.65 2.11 92.40 98.70 8.00
Ecuador	 96.63 -0.40 4.10 90.50 99.10 4.00
El	Salvador 93.04 0.61 4.66 87.40 99.50 5.00
Guatemala 44.12 0.99 7.55 34.80 52.30 5.00
Guyana 90.79 -0.26 4.75 83.30 95.00 10.00
Honduras 61.46 1.77 13.94 46.90 82.90 5.00
Mexico 92.12 0.30 4.66 83.80 96.00 8.00
Nicaragua 71.37 1.94 9.62 61.00 88.00 6.00
Panama 89.84 0.36 2.17 85.80 93.50 14.00
Paraguay 73.73 1.54 13.85 60.80 95.80 6.00
Peru 72.03 1.58 13.33 52.50 86.70 9.00
Suriname 87.58 0.78 4.40 80.00 91.20 6.00
Uruguay 99.54 -0.01 0.15 99.30 99.70 5.00
Venezuela 95.00 -0.01 0.73 94.00 95.70 4.00
No.	
Observation
Table	3.7:	MDG	5	Indicator:	Proportion	of	Births	Attended	by	Skilled	Health	Personnel	
(1990-2014)
Source:	World	Bank:	UNICEF,	State	of	the	World's	Children,	Childinfo,	and	Demographic	and	
Health	Surveys  
Relative success for this indicator is noted in countries with higher percentages.  
The countries that have the most consistent and highest percentages for this indicator are 
indicated by the mean.  These countries are Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay.  
The determination as to which countries have achieved significant improvement over the 
time series comes from analyzing countries with both high standard deviations and 
average changes.  These countries are Bolivia, Brazil, Honduras, Paraguay, and Peru.   
The second target for MDG 5 is target 5.B: achieve, by 2015, universal access to 
reproductive health.  Under this target are four indicators for success.  These indicators 
are: contraceptive prevalence rate, adolescent birth rate, antenatal care coverage (at least 
one visit and at least four visits), and unmet need for family planning. Although target 
5.B was outlined in the original millennium goals document, these indicators were not. In 
June 2008 amendments were made, and these four indicators were added to measure and 
track success of MDG target 5.B.  
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The first indicator for this target deals with contraceptive prevalence. The UN 
defines contraceptive prevalence rate as: 
The percentage of women married or in-union aged 15 to 49 who are currently 
using, or whose sexual partner is using, at least one method of contraception, 
regardless of the method used. 
In addition to this definition, the UN supplements the methods, both modern and 
traditional, that are considered in analyzing and computing this indicator. 
Modern methods of contraception include female and male sterilization, oral 
hormonal pills, the intra-uterine device (IUD), the male condom, injectables, the 
implant (including Norplant), vaginal barrier methods, the female condom and 
emergency contraception. Traditional methods of contraception include the 
rhythm (periodic abstinence), withdrawal, lactational amenorrhea method (LAM) 
and folk methods (mdgs.un.org).12 
The data for this indicator was accessed through World Bank who cited their sources of 
information as follows: UNICEF's State of the World's Children and Childinfo, United 
Nations Population Division's World Contraceptive Use, household surveys including 
Demographic and Health Surveys and Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys.  Although not 
explicitly stated, a higher prevalence percentage in the data set is assumed to indicate 
closer achievement of target 5.B. Table 3.8 shows the descriptive statistics for this 
indicator.    
																																																								
12 Computation for the indicator accounts for both modern and traditional methods.   
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Mean Mean	Δ S.D. Min Max
Country:
Argentina 71.80 3.25 9.19 65.30 78.30 2.00
Belize 48.08 0.75 10.11 34.30 56.10 4.00
Bolivia 53.20 1.28 6.49 45.30 60.60 5.00
Brazil 72.17 1.95 11.40 59.20 80.60 3.00
Chile 58.37 -0.02 2.35 56.00 60.70 3.00
Colombia 74.50 0.65 5.40 66.10 79.10 5.00
Costa	Rica 83.61 -2.89 8.80 75.00 96.00 7.00
Cuba 75.48 0.25 2.36 72.60 77.80 6.00
Dominican	Republic 66.24 1.52 5.71 56.40 72.90 8.00
Ecuador	 65.10 1.59 7.97 56.80 72.70 3.00
El	Salvador 63.20 1.28 8.44 53.30 72.50 4.00
Guatemala 41.75 1.65 9.57 31.40 54.10 4.00
Guyana 37.36 0.82 3.34 34.20 42.50 5.00
Honduras 59.38 1.30 10.95 46.70 73.20 5.00
Mexico 70.29 0.13 3.74 63.10 74.50 9.00
Nicaragua 66.08 1.83 12.11 48.70 80.40 5.00
Panama 52.20 52.20 52.20 1.00
Paraguay 63.66 1.92 12.53 48.40 79.40 5.00
Peru 70.80 0.54 5.11 59.00 75.50 11.00
Suriname 45.83 0.12 2.70 42.10 48.00 4.00
Uruguay 79.67 0.00 3.79 77.00 84.00 3.00
Venezuela 64.15 2.46 8.70 58.00 70.30 2.00
Source:	World	Bank:	UNICEF's	State	of	the	World's	Children	and	Childinfo,	United	Nations		
Population	Division's	World	Contraceptive	Use,	household	surveys	including	demographic	and
	health	suverys	and	multiple	indicator	cluster	surveys.
No.	
Observation
Table	3.8:	MDG	5	Indicator:	Contraceptive	Prevalence	Rate	(1990-2014)
 
As mentioned previously, relative success for this indicator is represented by a 
higher percentage for that country.  It is important to note that Argentina, Panama, and 
Venezuela have 1-2 observations for this data set. Argentina’s percentage indicates that it 
has one of the highest percentages for the contraceptive prevalence rate.  In addition to 
Argentina, the countries Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Peru, and Paraguay have 
the highest average percentage for this indicator.  A comparison between the average 
change and standard deviation helps determine which countries experienced significant 
and relative change.  These countries had the highest average change as well as 
correspondingly high numbers of standard variation.  These countries are Brazil, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay.        
The next indicator for this target B of MDG 5 focuses on the adolescent birth rate.   
According to the UN, the adolescent birth rate: 
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measures the annual number of births to women 15 to 19 years of age per 1,000 
women in that age group. It represents the risk of childbearing among adolescent 
women 15 to 19 years of age. It is also referred to as the age-specific fertility rate 
for women aged 15-19 (mdgs.un.org). 
Pregnancies in adolescent girls have a higher risk of health complications.  To eliminate 
this risk to young women, countries should strive to take measures to lower the 
adolescent birth rate.  Progress in this area is monitored in the data set by tracking the 
adolescent birth rate throughout the years.  Countries indicating lowered rates over time 
indicate relative progress toward target 5.B. The data for this indicator was taken from 
the World Bank DataBank where they cited the United Nations Population Division, 
World Population Prospects as their source.  Table 3.9 displays the descriptive statistics 
for this indicator.   
Mean Mean	Δ S.D. Min Max
Country:
Argentina 66.50 -0.39 4.32 60.59 73.28 25
Belize 93.07 -2.46 19.51 66.67 125.67 25
Bolivia 85.36 -0.92 7.51 71.15 93.20 25
Brazil 76.72 -0.54 5.86 67.31 83.58 25
Chile 56.16 -0.68 5.37 48.11 64.42 25
Colombia 74.20 -1.18 11.66 51.67 86.32 25
Costa	Rica 73.62 -1.51 12.20 57.04 93.17 25
Cuba 57.62 -1.23 10.12 46.17 75.80 25
Dominican	Republic 108.61 -0.59 4.49 98.43 114.30 25
Ecuador	 82.54 -0.44 2.89 76.17 86.78 25
El	Salvador 83.87 -1.54 11.40 65.56 102.51 25
Guatemala 103.17 -1.74 13.60 81.40 123.05 25
Guyana 95.39 -0.37 3.32 88.42 100.18 25
Honduras 98.94 -2.65 21.20 65.66 129.30 25
Mexico 75.63 -0.83 6.64 63.46 84.14 25
Nicaragua 116.56 -2.59 18.79 89.63 151.73 25
Panama 86.61 -0.88 6.42 75.33 96.52 25
Paraguay 77.64 -1.42 12.78 57.98 92.40 25
Peru 61.67 -0.88 7.71 49.68 70.80 25
Suriname 56.01 -0.88 6.43 46.52 67.69 25
Uruguay 63.93 -0.52 4.37 56.51 70.60 25
Venezuela 87.43 -0.72 5.39 79.67 97.06 25
Source:	World	Bank:	United	Nations	Population	Division,	World	Population	Prospects
No.	
Observation
Table	3.9:	MDG	5	Indicator:	Adolescent	Birth	Rate	(1990-2014)
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As previously stated, relative success for this indicator is represented by lower 
and decreased rates through the time series.  The countries with the lowest average 
adolescent birth rate are Argentina, Chile, Cuba, Peru, Suriname, and Uruguay.  Arguably 
more significant, however, is the average change for the countries for this indicator.  
Although these countries may not have the lowest average rate, their average change per 
year suggests that they will continue to decrease significantly.  These countries are 
Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.   
The next indicator tracks progress for countries that institute increased levels of 
antenatal care coverage.  This indicator measures this coverage for one visit and for 
coverage spanning four visits.  The UN defines antenatal care coverage as:  
 [t]he percentage of women aged 15-49 with a live birth in a given time period 
that received antenatal care provided by a skilled health personnel (doctors, 
nurses, or midwives) at least once (then four) during pregnancy, as a percentage 
of women age 15-49 years with a live birth in a given time period (mdgs.un.org). 
According to the WHO, an antenatal care visit should include: blood pressure 
measurement, urine testing for bacteriuria and proteinuria, blood testing to detect syphilis 
and severe anemia, and weight/height measurement (optional).   This indicator is 
measured as a percentage of women ages 15-49 who have received antenatal care (at least 
once and at least four visits) in relation to all women aged 15-49 with a live birth in the 
same period.  In the data set, the higher the percentage of this indicator, overall and over 
time, represents relative success for target 5.B. The data for this indicator comes from the 
WorldBank who cites UNICEF, State of the World's Children, Childinfo, and 
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Demographic and Health Surveys.  Tables 3.10 and 3.11 show the descriptive statistics 
for this indicator.   
Mean Mean	Δ S.D. Min Max
Country:
Argentina 97.45 0.19 1.78 95.00 99.20 4
Belize 96.81 0.55 2.13 94.00 100.00 9
Bolivia 73.80 2.77 13.47 52.50 85.80 5
Brazil 95.69 0.37 4.43 85.70 98.20 7
Chile 95.00 95.00 95.00 1
Colombia 89.18 0.75 6.66 82.00 97.00 5
Costa	Rica 86.66 0.20 11.62 69.60 98.10 7
Cuba 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 9
Dominican	Republic 98.10 0.35 0.91 96.90 99.30 7
Ecuador	 75.90 0.55 7.77 68.80 84.20 3
El	Salvador 81.18 1.69 11.11 68.70 94.00 4
Guatemala 72.40 3.76 19.44 52.50 93.20 4
Guyana 89.67 1.38 6.49 80.90 98.00 7
Honduras 88.58 0.35 5.69 82.60 96.60 5
Mexico 94.30 0.34 5.53 86.10 97.70 4
Nicaragua 84.68 1.25 8.88 71.50 94.70 5
Panama 84.00 2.15 16.69 72.20 95.80 2
Paraguay 90.42 0.59 4.91 83.90 96.30 5
Peru 86.39 1.19 12.38 63.90 96.00 9
Suriname 90.49 -0.05 0.50 89.90 91.00 7
Uruguay 95.77 -0.03 1.59 94.00 97.10 3
Venezuela 94.10 94.10 94.10 1
No.	
Observation
Source:	World	Bank:	UNICEF,	State	of	the	World's	Children,	Childinfo,	and	Demographic	and	Health	
Surveys
Table	3.10:	MDG	5	Indicator:	Antenatal	Care	Coverage	(at	least	one	visit)	(1990-2014)	
 
Mean Mean	Δ S.D. Min Max
Country:
Argentina 89.55 0.07 0.35 89.30 89.80 2
Belize 78.63 0.17 3.87 76.40 83.10 3
Bolivia 56.50 2.05 11.40 48.00 72.10 4
Brazil 86.82 0.70 5.48 75.90 90.50 6
Chile
Colombia 79.93 0.97 9.19 67.00 88.60 4
Costa	Rica 88.00 1.47 3.11 85.80 90.20 2
Cuba 99.75 0.33 0.50 99.00 100.00 4
Dominican	Republic 92.90 0.46 3.07 87.60 95.40 5
Ecuador	 60.55 -0.61 4.31 57.50 63.60 2
El	Salvador 73.57 0.71 4.10 71.20 78.30 3
Guatemala
Guyana 78.50 78.50 78.50 1
Honduras 71.73 1.93 15.51 58.60 88.90 4
Mexico 89.07 0.72 3.23 86.30 92.62 3
Nicaragua 74.06 2.01 9.61 61.60 87.80 5
Panama
Paraguay 78.10 0.99 12.76 65.00 90.50 3
Peru 76.54 1.53 20.25 47.00 94.40 10
Suriname 66.80 66.80 66.80 1
Uruguay 93.55 -3.55 5.02 90.00 97.10 2
Venezuela
No.	
Observation
Source:	World	Bank:	UNICEF,	State	of	the	World's	Children,	Childinfo,	and	Demographic	and	
Health	Surveys
Table	3.11:	MDG	5	Indicator:	Antenatal	Care	Coverage	(at	least	four	visits)	(1990-2014)
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As mentioned previously, a high percentage for both parts of this indicator 
indicates its relative success and achievement.  The focus of these tables involves an 
analysis of the mean and mean change for each country.  For table B5.1, the countries 
with the highest mean change are Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, 
Panama, and Peru.  It is important to note that Chile and Venezuela both have only one 
observation for this data set. Chile, although it has one observation, its percentage is one 
of the highest and is included in the aforementioned list.  The countries with the highest 
mean for table B5.1 are Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, and 
Uruguay.  When considering table B5.2 and the mean and mean change, some of the 
countries with the highest percentages for each were also seen in table B5.1.  The 
countries with the highest mean change, as seen in both tables, are Bolivia, Nicaragua, 
and Peru.  The countries with highest mean across both tables are Argentina, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, and Uruguay.        
The final indicator for this target is the unmet need for family planning.  The UN 
defines this indicator as 
Women with unmet need are those who are fecund and sexually active but are not 
using any method of contraception, and report not wanting any more children or 
wanting to delay the next child. The concept of unmet need points to the gap 
between women's reproductive intentions and their contraceptive behavior 
(mdgs.un.org). 
The UN additionally notes that the concept of unmet need points to the gap between 
women's reproductive intentions and their contraceptive behavior. The method of 
computation for this indicator is the percentage of women in the reproductive ages who 
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are in a consensual relationship and who have an unmet need for family planning over 
(total/calculated) women of reproductive age who are married or in a consensual 
relationship.  The lower the percentage rate in the data set, overall and overtime, indicates 
relative achievement/success for target 5.B.  The World Bank, who cites household 
surveys, including Demographic and Health Surveys and Multiple Indicator Cluster 
Surveys, provides the data for this. United Nations Population Division largely compiled 
the data used by the World Bank.  Table 3.12 presents the descriptive statistics for this 
indicator.  
Mean Mean	Δ S.D. Min Max
Country:
Argentina 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
Belize 20.80 -0.51 4.90 15.90 25.70 3
Bolivia 24.60 -0.63 3.91 20.10 28.90 4
Brazil 8.40 -0.48 3.39 6.00 10.80 2
Chile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
Colombia 10.34 -0.29 2.29 8.00 13.70 5
Costa	Rica 6.30 0.14 1.84 5.00 7.60 2
Cuba 9.10 0.00 9.10 9.10 1
Dominican	Republic 13.63 -0.39 3.15 10.80 19.40 6
Ecuador	 10.87 -0.78 3.97 7.40 15.20 3
El	Salvador 17.68 0.17 3.54 14.20 22.30 4
Guatemala 25.83 -0.34 3.39 20.80 28.10 4
Guyana 28.50 0.00 28.50 28.50 1
Honduras 14.18 -0.42 3.76 10.70 18.00 4
Mexico 11.98 -0.60 2.55 9.80 16.10 5
Nicaragua 16.78 -0.98 5.59 10.70 23.90 4
Panama 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
Paraguay 13.04 -0.73 6.82 4.70 19.20 5
Peru 13.30 -0.76 4.38 9.30 21.60 8
Suriname 16.90 0.00 16.90 16.90 1
Uruguay 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
Venezuela 18.90 18.90 18.90 1
Source:	World	Bank:	Household	surveys,	including	Demographic	and	Health	Surveys	and	Multiple
	Indicator	Cluster	Surveys.	Largely	compiled	by	United	Nations	Population	Division.
No.	
Observation
Table	3.12:	MDG	5	Indicator:	Unmet	Need	for	Family	Planning	(1990-2014)
 
As mentioned above, a lower percentage rate indicates achievement/relative 
success of this indicator.  There is no data available for this indicator for Argentina, 
Chile, Panama, or Uruguay.  In addition, Cuba, Suriname, and Venezuela only have one 
observation.  Noteworthy of mention is Cuba.  The lowest means presented in this data 
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set are for Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru.  The countries with the significant mean 
changes are Brazil, Costa Rica, and Cuba.       
 
Conclusion 
An overview of the descriptive statistics for MDGs 3 and 5 shows that the 
countries that achieved the objectives of the most indicators are: Argentina, Chile, 
Uruguay, and Peru.  In addition, the countries that experienced the highest change over 
the time series for the indicators are: Brazil, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.  
Recognition of these countries success is an important first step in learning what factors 
drive these countries achievement for MDGs 3 and 5.  After identifying these countries, 
further study is warranted to discover what these factors are. Analyzing how these 
countries interact internally (between social and political settings) and internationally 
may be useful in identifying policy influence in both settings.  An analysis of these 
interactions may help determine whether international pressures, like the setting of UN’s 
MDGs, or domestic policy initiatives are more successful in promoting policy change.  In 
addition, keeping these countries in mind with the following analysis in Chapter IV also 
draws attention to a study of the variables’ influences on a per-country basis.    
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Chapter IV: Women’s Movement and Women in 
Legislature Variable Analysis 
In addition to the descriptive statistics analysis from the previous chapter, I also 
analyze women in legislature variables and women’s movement variables to assess their 
effect on each MDG indicator. Keeping in mind the topics and issues discussed in the 
literature review, I determine the components for these two variables, which are 
discussed below.  For this analysis I compile data for these selected components to test 
the variable(s) for women in parliament and women’s movement presence.      
 
Variables of Women in Legislature 
The percentage of women in legislature is an indicator for MDG 3. Isolating this 
indicator as its own independent variable in this analysis creates more space for an in-
depth analysis of its effect and influence.  Its selection as an indicator for the 
empowerment of women attests to its importance in that process.  In addition, isolating 
this indicator as an independent variable addresses Beckwith’s framework questions 
involving the “who” and “where” for the expression of women’s interests.   For this 
variable, the legislature is the venue where women interests are expressed. Concerning 
the “who,” this variable sheds light on the theoretical discourse involving substantive and 
descriptive representation and, subsequently, whether or not women represent women.  
Determining whether or not the descriptive make-up of legislature has a statistically 
significant effect on the outcome of the MDGs speaks to its significance.  This variable’s 
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significance addresses the argument on whether or not descriptive representation leads to 
or equates to substantive representation.  The data for this variable, denoted as Women in 
parliament, comes from the same source used in the descriptive statistics for indicator 
3.3, the World Bank DataBank who references their data from the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union (IPU).  
Along with this women-in-parliament variable, Latin American countries with 
women heads of states are isolated and accounted for in this analysis.  Since the 
government is the institutionalized venue for representation, special notice is given to 
countries that have elected a female head of state.  This position is above that of women 
in parliament, but may be seen as taking place within the same institutionalized, 
legislative venue.  If this variable has significant results, it can offer insight on the effect 
women heads of state have on the women in parliament and on the outcomes of MDGs 3 
and 5.  To account for women heads of state, a dummy variable is used across the time 
series to indicate which Latin American countries have had or have female heads of states 
from the years 1990-2015.  
Another topic of interest concerning women in legislature is gender quotas.   
Discussed previously in the literature review, gender quotas and the theory of a critical 
mass for descriptive representation is an area of particular interest for women in 
parliament.  Isolating this variable for the relative success of the MDGs may offer 
implications concerning their effectiveness in achieving descriptive representation.  In 
addition, the enacting of gender quotas in government indicates their relevance to a 
political agenda.  This may be relevant in showing women activism and women 
involvement in society and government.  To account for this gender quota variable, I 
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collected information from the gender quota project.  Since most Latin American 
countries in this study have a lower chamber of government, information regarding the 
existence and percentage required by gender quotas in the lower chamber was collected 
where available.  In the following analysis, the women in parliament, heads of state, and 
gender quota variables are denoted as WIP, HOS, and GQ, respectively.             
 
Social Movement Variable 
Currently, there is not a comprehensive women’s social movement variable 
developed for the countries of Latin America.  Based on prior theoretical research and 
research from other political scientists, I compiled the following components to create my 
own variable for women’s social movements.  
For the social movement variable, I pull from a variety of sources to monitor 
women’s protest activity in a given country at a given time.  Women’s movement 
strength and autonomy is provided by Htun and Weldon, “Violence Against Women: A 
Comparative Analysis of Progress on Women’s Human Rights.” In this paper, Htun and 
Weldon provide a snapshot of existence and strength of women’s movements for 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela (21).  They code for existence 
of women’s movements for these countries during these years based on historical and 
narrative accounts.  Strength is coded as 0, 1, or 2.  Htun and Weldon determine strength 
by monitoring policy outcomes, massive protests, and media presence.     
In addition to the information collected from Htun and Weldon, information for 
women’s movement between 1990-1995 for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
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Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, and Venezuela is collected from 
Teresa Valdés’ book De lo social a lo político.  In her book, she reports a variety of 
information concerning women’s involvement within the state, from which I pull two 
specific indicators. The first, “reconstitución del movimiento de mujeres” follows a 
reconstruction of the women’s movement from 1975-1995 for the aforementioned 
countries. For this indicator, Valdés tracks studies and groups that begin to develop 
throughout the latter half of the twentieth century and focus on various women issues 
concerning things such as health, environment, and identity.  The second indicator 
involves the “participación social de las mujeres en los últimos veinte años.”  For this 
indicator, Valdés looks for women’s social participation within the last twenty years, five 
of which (1990-1995) fall within the scope of this time series.  This social participation 
focuses on the formation of women’s unions and their participation in strikes and 
protests.  Information noted by Valdés in her book is coded by occurrence.   
The remaining information for the social movement variable comes from an 
overview of newspaper headlines and articles that mention women’s protests in the Latin 
America countries. Information for this indicator is pulled from a database of compiled 
regional newspapers accessed through the Latin American Intelligence Service database.  
I used the key words “women” “protest” “movement” and “mothers” to filter through 
articles.  I then identified any articles from 1990-2014 resulting from the key term search 
and skimmed each article to determine if reference was made to a women’s protest or 
movement in a given country.  In addition to this data source, I accessed an international 
newspaper protest compilation database. Within this database, I repeated the key term 
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search used for the LatAm database.  Women’s protest existence is then coded as 1 for 
countries where women’s protest for that country is mentioned. 
The information from these components was compiled as a dummy summary 
variable coded as either 0 or 1.   A country is considered to have women movement 
presence when a 1 exists in a given year across any of the aforementioned components of 
the variable.  This dummy summary variable method is used to ensure that the maximum 
number of countries applicable may be included, and to prevent problems with 
duplication of events that were recorded by more than one of the women’s movement 
variable components.  In the following analysis SM denotes this women’s movement 
variable. 
      
Data Analysis 
In this data section, women in parliament (WIP), women heads of state (HOS), 
gender quotas (GQ), and women’s social movements (SM) are the independent variables.  
The dependent variables are the indicators for MDGs 3 and 5.  By testing the relationship 
between these variables, I determine if the independent variables have an effect on the 
outcome of each indicator.  The data was run through the statistics program STATA.  
Table 4.1 presents a summary of the results.  
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WIP HOS GQ SM
Goal	3:	Promote	Gender	Equality	and	Empower	Women
dv1:	Primary	Education -0.000 0.002 -0.007 0.001
dv2:	Secondary	Education 0.000 0.005 -0.003 0.000
dv3:	Tertiary	Education 0.004* 0.059** 0.007 0.009
dv4:	Wage	Employment	(in	non	ag.	Sector) 0.162*** 0.488 0.451 -0.416
Goal	5:	Improve	Maternal	Health
dv6:	Maternal	Mortatly	Ratio -1.700*** 23.623 -26.718* 24.404*
dv7:	Contraceptive	Prevalence	Rate 0.365** -9.236** 11.016*** 0.010
dv8:	Adolescent	Birth	Rate -0.685*** 0.295 -8.382*** -1.686
dv9:	Pregnant	Antenatal	care	(1	visit) 0.616*** 5.566 3.268 -0.018
dv10:	Pregnant	Antenatal	care	(4	visits) 0.912*** 1.047 13.130*** -1.670
dv11:	Unmet	need	for	contraceptive	 -0.099 0.000 -4.877*** -0.000
p-value	≤	*	0.1;	**	.05;	***	.025
Table	4.1:	Summary	Table	for	Multivariate	Analysis
 
This table displays the coefficients for the independent variables in relation to their effect 
on each MDG indicator, or the dependent variables. Note that for the dependent variable 
indicators maternal mortality ratio, adolescent birth rate, and unmet need for 
contraceptives, a negative coefficient is desired because the success of these indicators 
over the time series is achieved by lowering their occurrences.   
The starred coefficients indicate the variables that have a statistically significant 
relationship, indicating a degree of correlation.  Statistically significant coefficients for 
women in parliament exist for maternal mortality ratio, contraceptive prevalence rate, 
adolescent birth rate, and pregnant antenatal care (for both 1 and 4 visits).  Significant 
coefficients for women heads of state occur for tertiary education and the contraceptive 
prevalence rate. For gender quotas, significant coefficients exist for the contraceptive 
prevalence rate, adolescent birth rate, prenatal antenatal care (for both 1 and 4 visits), and 
the unmet need for contraception.  It is interesting to note that the only statistically 
significant correlation for the women’s social movement variable exists for the maternal 
mortality ratio.  This particular case, along with the case involving women in wage 
employment, is discussed in further detail below.   
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Interesting case: MDG 3 
An interesting case for MDG 3 is the indicator for women employment in the 
non-agriculture sector. When women gain access to this workforce, it allows them to take 
a greater share of their economy.  Greater access to money arguably allows women 
access to greater freedoms and independence, which results in women empowerment.  
For this dependent variable, “women in parliament” is the only statistically significant 
independent variable, shown below in Table 4.2.                
Coefficient P>[t]
WIP 0.162*** 0.000
HOS 0.488 0.286
GQ 0.451 0.359
SM -0.416 0.259
p-value	≤	*	0.1;	**	.05;	***	.025
Table	4.2:	Women	Employment	in	the	
non-Agriculture	Sector
 
This indicates that a .162 increase of women in parliament results in a unit increase for 
that dependent variable, in this case women employment in the non-agriculture sector. 
Recognizing that “women in legislature” has a statistically significant effect on this 
important indicator potentially speaks to the discourse surrounding the effectiveness of 
the legislative venue for the expression of women’s interests. In this instance, the data 
supports the notion that increased women presence in legislature positively correlates 
with women’s employment in the non-agriculture sector.     
 
Interesting case: MDG 5 
An interesting case for MDG 5 involves the maternal mortality ratio. This 
indicator is significant because the prevention of mother mortality is particularly relevant 
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to most women. The importance and centrality of this issue as a woman’s interest makes 
it a useful indicator to track progress over the venues to determine their effectiveness in 
promoting women’s interests. Shown in the following table, the significant variables for 
this indicator are women in parliament, gender quotas, and women’s social movement.  
As discussed previously, progress for this indicator is represented by a negative 
coefficient, so that maternal mortality decreases over time.  Counterintuitively, the 
women social movement indicator has the opposite desired effect on the maternal 
mortality ratio.  This may be due in part to the construction of the social movement 
variable itself.  However, it is still interesting to note that women social movement 
presence, at least in this instance, may not have as direct of an effect as originally 
anticipated, as shown below in Table 4.3.  
Coefficient P>[t]
WIP -1.696*** 0.017
HOS 23.623 0.179
GQ -26.718* 0.051
SM 24.404* 0.051
p-value	≤	*	0.1;	**	.05;	***	.025
Table	4.3:	Maternal	Mortality	Ratio
 
This is the only case where the women’s social movement variable has a significant 
effect on an MDG indicator.  However, women in parliament and the gender quota 
variable have a significant negative correlation with this indicator.  This indicates that 
these two variables are important in the promotion of women’s interests, and further 
shows the effectiveness of the legislature as a venue for the promotion of women’s 
interests.  
 
Summary of Findings 
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In this thesis, I attempted to discover what effect, if any, women in legislature and 
women social movements have on the promotion of women’s interests in Latin America.  
To gauge this, I used MDGs 3 and 5 and their indicators to quantifiably track Latin 
American countries from 1990-2015.  The analysis presented in this chapter shows that 
women in legislature and gender quotas have the most statistically significant effect on 
the MDG indicators. Surprisingly, the women’s movement indicator did not have much 
of an effect on the dependent variables.  
My first hypothesis, presented in chapter 2 stated that I expected to find a positive 
correlation between the meeting of MDG’s 3 and 5 and the proportion of women in 
parliament.  As noted in Table 4.1, this hypothesis holds true for 7 of the 11 indicators for 
MDGs 3 and 5.  This shows that women in parliament play a significant role in 
influencing the outcome of MDGs 3 and 5 for the Latin American countries in this study.  
Also particularly relevant to women in parliament is the use of gender quotas in Latin 
America.  In 4 of the 5 instances that gender quotas are statistically significant, it is in 
conjunction with women in parliament.  This points to a larger discourse indicating that 
gender quotas can be and, in these 4 instances, are, influential for women in the political 
process.  From these instances it may be concluded that gender quotas are key in either 
fostering or maintaining women presence in legislature.   
   My second hypothesis stated that I expected to find a strong, positive correlation 
with the meeting of MDGs 3 and 5 in countries where women movement presence is 
strong.  The analysis from this chapter does not support this hypothesis.  As noted 
previously in the one case where social movements had a statistically significant effect, it 
was the opposite of the desired outcome.  This lack of influence may be due to the fact 
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that a comprehensive women’s movement indicator does not yet exist for Latin America.  
Regardless, however, this adverse affect of the women’s movement indicator on the 
maternal mortality ratio may point to a larger discussion arguing that women’s movement 
presence detracts from women in the political process rendering it ineffective.  However, 
since this adverse effect occurs only once on the social movement indicator, it is difficult 
to draw conclusions in support of that argument.  Instead, it is more likely, based off this 
analysis, that the women’s movement presence is negligent to Latin American countries 
success of MDGs 3 and 5 over this time series. 
 
Conclusion 
As I have mentioned previously, these two hypotheses are not meant to be 
exclusive, and neither are these analyses. The analysis in this chapter shows that “women 
in parliament” is an important variable in relation to the outcomes of the indicators for 
MDGs 3 and 5. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, women in parliament is an 
indicator for MDG 3, but for the purposes of this analysis, this indicator was isolated to 
become its own independent variable.  Given that the results from this analysis reveal the 
significance of this variable, the following question arises: what effect do the other 
independent variables have on the outcome of women in parliament?  This subsequent 
question prompted the additional data analysis in which the women-in-parliament 
variable was held dependent, as it would be an indicator for MDG 3. The results are 
presented in Table 4.4. 
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Coefficient P>[t]
HOS 3.15*** 0.018
GQ 8.24*** 0.000
SM 3.455*** 0.000
p-value	≤	*	0.1;	**	.05;	***	.025
Table	4.4: 	Women	in	Parliament
 
Not surprisingly, all three variables have a statistically significant effect on women in 
parliament.  What is surprising, however, is that given their p-values, all three variables 
are highly significant. This high significance stresses the degree of influence that women 
movement presence, women heads of state, and gender quotas have on fostering women 
in parliament.    
In addition to the analysis in this chapter, the Latin American countries with 
greatest change and achievement of MDGs 3 and 5 from the analysis in chapter 3 are 
relevant for an in-depth study for these variables.  Implications for further study involve 
focusing on the role of women in these countries, historically, politically, and socially.  
The understanding that women in parliament is a driving force for the promotion of 
MDGs 3 and 5 warrants a greater understanding of this variable’s influence and effect 
within the countries that were seen as having the greatest accomplishment of MDGs 3 
and 5 in the analysis presented in chapter 3.  Understanding the affect of the women in 
parliament variable and a study of these particular countries will hopefully shed more 
light on what other factors are important and relevant in fostering women’s involvement 
in legislature and promoting women’s interests. 
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